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NOTES & COMMENTS
GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT?
PROTECTIONS FOR INNOCENT
OWNERS IN CIVIL FORFEITURE
CASES UNDER 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) AND
NEW YORK'S CPLR ARTICLE 13-A
Section 88 1(a) of Title 21 of the United States Code' authorizes
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, or ac-
quired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing,
or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or
(9), except that-(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of
business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance
was a consenting party or privy to a violation of the subchapter or subchapter II of
this chapter;
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by reason
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civil forfeiture' of certain property which is used for, intended to
of any act or omission establishing by the owner thereof to have been committed or
omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully
in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws
of the United States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an in-
terest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blind-
ness of the owner.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange,
and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of the subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any lease-
hold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
(8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this
subchapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines,
all encapsulating machines, all gelatin capsules, which have been imported, ex-
ported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be distributed, im-
ported, or exported, in violation of a felony provision of this subchapter or sub-
chapter 11 of this chapter.
Id.
' See, e.g., United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d
343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990) (provisions for civil forfeiture found in 21 U.S.C. § 881). See also
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989) (congressional intent was
for 21 US.C. § 881 to be civil in nature); United States v. Two Hundred Eighty Thousand
Five Hundred and Five Dollars, 655 F. Supp. 1487, 1498 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (forfeiture action
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX4) and (aX6) is civil action). See generally Goldsmith & Linderman,
Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need For Further Law Reform, 1989 Duxa L.J.
1254, 1267-82 (1989) (discussion of federal civil forfeiture provisions under 21 U.S.C. §
88 1(a)).
Forfeiture is that body of law which authorizes the government to take property without
compensating the owner. See BLAca's LAw DICTIONAay 650 (6th ed. 1990). "A comprehen-
sive term which means a divestiture of specific property without compensation." Id. Prop-
erty subject to forfeiture falls into two categories. See United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d
1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussion of legal recognition of per se and derivative contra-
band distinction). See also Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: What
Process is Due, 41 Sw. L.J. 1111, 1118 (1988) (author suggests four part classification: con-
traband, derivative contraband, proceeds, and derivative proceeds); Note, The Innocent
Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
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be used for,3 or facilitates drug-related activity.' Congress enacted
the statute to strengthen law enforcement and to attack the eco-
nomic bases of the drug industry.6 Many states have also enacted
58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471, 472 n.6 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Innocent Owner Defense] (two
types of property seized by forfeiture in connection with narcotics violations: contraband
per se and derivative contraband). Contraband per se is property which is itself illegal, such
as narcotics and drug paraphernalia. See United States v. Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five
Hundred Dollars, 671 F.2d 293, 297 n.9 (8th Cir. 1982) (contraband per se is property
which is unlawful to possess). See, e.g., 21 US.C. §§ 812, 881(f) (1988) (heroin); 26 U.S.C. §
5615 (1988) (moonshine whiskey); id. at § 5861(d) (1988) (sawed off shotguns).
Derivative contraband is property which was used for or acquired through illegal activ-
ity, such as money, vehicles, or real property. See Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Dol-
lars, 671 F.2d at 297 n.8 ("derivative contraband" is property which can be lawfully pos-
sessed, such as automobiles, boats, planes, and currency, but which becomes forfeitable
because of unlawful use). See also supra note I (statutory provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3),
(4), (5), (6), (7) (1988) (other examples of derivative contraband). See generally Note, Inno-
cent Owner Defense, supra, at 472 n.6 (distinction between contraband per se and derivative
contraband).
Civil forfeitures are unique in that they are "quasi-criminal" in nature. See One Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697 (1965) (all civil forfeiture proceedings
based on commission of criminal offenses are "quasi-criminal" in character) (construing
Boyd v. United States, 166 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1885)). See generally Note, Civil Forfeiture of
Real Property: The Government's Weapon Against Drug Traffickers Injures Innocent Owners, 10
PAcZ L. Rav. 485, 515-19 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Civil Forfeiture] (comparison of civil and
criminal forfeiture including analysis of where criminal trial safeguards are applied to civil
actions).
I See supra note 1 (pertinent provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)). See, e.g., United States v.
One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 887 (11 th Cir. 1989) (yacht subject to
forfeiture on ground it was "intended for use" in transporting controlled substances);
United States v. One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, 705 F.2d 862, 863 (6th Cir. 1983) (intent,
not actual presence of controlled substance, is determining factor for civil forfeiture pursu-
ant to 21 USC. § 881(a)).
I See supra note 1 (pertinent provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)). See also United States v.
Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir.) (vehicles or conveyances subject to forfeiture where
there is probable cause to believe vehicles facilitated transportation of controlled sub-
stance), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984); United States v. One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 563
F. Supp. 470, 473 (D.C. Pa. 1983) (for vehicle to be subject to forfeiture it is sufficient that
it is used to "facilitate" purchase, sale or transportation of controlled substance).
I See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 84
Stat. 1236, 1236 (1970) (Controlled Substances Act is Title II within comprehensive legis-
lation). See, e.g., S. REP'. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Arm.im NEws 3182, 3374 (1985) (stated purpose of Act was to enhance govern-
mental power against drug trafficking).
I See 124 CONG. Rac 12,790 (1978) (statement of Rep. Carter). "The purpose of [this
amendment] is to provide Federal drug enforcement officials with the ability to strike at
the profits of illicit trafficking in abusable controlled substances." Id. See also United States
v. Premises Known as 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1989) (intent of
forfeiture provisions is to deprive criminals of their tools of illegality). See generally Wisot-
sky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L.
Rav. 1305, 1364-77 (1983) (discussion of need to use financial controls such as asset seizure
to control drug trafficking).
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forfeiture statutes for similar purposes.7 New York has such a stat-
ute,6 which has recently been amended to become an even more
effective tool for combatting drug trafficking.' Although both
statutes are designed to reach property involved in drug transac-
tions,10 neither seeks to subject the property of innocent owners
to forfeiture." The federal statute provides an affirmative defense
which requires the owner to establish a lack of knowledge or con-
sent to the illegal activity,' while the New York statute requires
prosecutors to prove the culpability of the defendant." This Note
See, e.g., DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 4784 (1983 & Supp. 1990) (similar to 21 U.S.C. §
881); IDAHO CODE tit. 37, § 37-2744 (1977 & Supp. 1990) (same); Drug Asset Forfeiture
Procedure Act, Act No. 86-1382, 1990 Ill. Advance Leg. Serv. 1382 (same); MASS ANN.
LAWS ch. 94C, § 47 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (same); NEa. REV. STAT. § 28-431
(1984) (same); Oto Rav. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2933.43 (Page 1987 & Supp. 1989) (contra-
band and vehicles facilitating use of contraband subject to forfeiture); R.I. GEN. LAWS Ch.
28, § 21-28-5.04.2 (Reenactment 1989) (property or proceeds of drug transactions subject
to in rem civil forfeiture); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4241 (1990 Supp.) (similar to 21 U.S.C. §
881).
6 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1310-12 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (proceeds and instru-
mentalities of crime subject to civil forfeiture). See also infra note 146 and accompanying
text (discussion of Article 13-A).
* See N.Y. Civ. PUAE L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (real property instrumen-
talities can now be forfeited in drug cases).
* See 21 U.SC. § 881(aX4) (1988) (forfeiture of conveyances used to transport drugs); 21
U.S.C. § 881(aX6) (1988) (forfeiture of proceeds from drug transactions); 21 U.S.C. §
881(aX7) (1988) (forfeiture of real property which facilitates drug transactions); N.Y. Cirv.
PRAac L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (forfeit use of property, proceeds, and
instrumentalities of crime).
11 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (aX4), (6) & (7) (1988) (affirmative defenses for innocent owners);
N.Y. Civ. PAC L. & R_ § 1311(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (court may dismiss or limit forfei-
ture in "interests of justice").
' 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph [(4XC), (6), (7)), to the extent of the owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowl-
edge or consent of that owner." Id.
The affirmative defense is commonly known as an "innocent owner defense." See United
States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 876 (2d Cir. 1990) (claimant does not deny that
drug activity took place, but rather asserts "innocent owner" defense), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1017 (1991). See also United States v. One 1985 BMW 318i, VIN
WBAAC8401F0685314, 696 F. Supp. 336, 339-40 (N.D. I1. 1988) (claimants have three
possible routes to defeat civil forfeiture, one of which is to show they fall within protection
of what has become judicially recognized as "innocent owner" exception to forfeiture);
United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 623 (3d
Cir. 1989) (spouse of defendant convicted of drug offenses could show innocent ownership
and avoid civil forfeiture of property). But see The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15
(1827) (under common law, forfeiture of property in felony cases was part or at least conse-
quence of criminal conviction, therefore innocence of owner was irrelevant).
18 See N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & R. § 131 1(IXa) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (requiring conviction
of defendant); N.Y. Cxv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1311 (1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (requiring proof
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will evaluate how well these statutes protect the property of inno-
cent owners.
Part I of this Note will provide an historical background of civil
forfeiture. Part II will examine the application of the federal stat-
ute, focusing on the construction of the statute's innocent owner
provisions. Part III will examine New York's most widely used
civil forfeiture statute and its impact on innocent owners. Finally,
this Note will propose two alternatives: first, a change in the pre-
sent statutory construction of the innocent owner provisions; sec-
ond, a congressional adoption of the New York approach to asset
forfeiture. It is submitted that either proposal would better pro-
tect the rights of innocent owners, while still preserving the goal
of depriving criminals the benefits of their drug activities.
I. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
A. Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture has a long and rich history." One of the earliest
references to civil forfeiture is found in Judaic law, 18 which pro-
vided for the forfeiture of an ox when it killed a person.16 In such
a case, the animal was stoned as a sacrifice to God17 and the owner
was not liable for the injury unless he was aware of the dangerous
propensities of the animal.18 One finds similar provisions in
of commission of crime). If the defendant did not commit a crime, tie prosecutor must
prove the defendant either knew of the crime or fraudulently obtained his or her interest
to avoid forfeiture. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 131 1(3)(bX2XA) & (B) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
14 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974) (discus-
sion of civil forfeiture's history including origins traceable to bible); UNrrwD STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JusrtcE, DRUG AGENT's GUIDE TO FoRErrtURE OF ASSETS 2 (1987) [hereinafter
GUIDE To FORFErrURE] (long history of forfeiture).
is See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680.
14 See ExoDus 21:28 (King James Version) (1972) ("lilf an ox gore a man or a woman,
that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the
owner of the ox shall be quit"). Cf. EXODUS 21:28 (New International Version) (1979) ("[i]f
a bull gores a man or a woman to death, the bull must be stoned to death, and its meat
must not be eaten. But the owner of the bull will not be held responsible").
17 See ExoDus 21:28 (King James Version) (1972).
IS d. EXODus 21:29 "But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it
hath been testified to his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but he hath killed a man or a
woman; the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." Id. However, if
demanded, the owner may make a payment in exchange for his life. Id. at 21:30. See gener.
ally Finkelstein, The Goring Ox. Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfditures, Wrongful
Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 Tgmp. L.Q. 169 (1973) (discussing religious
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Roman law.' 9 In both biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices,
an inanimate object which was directly or indirectly responsible
for a death was guilty and required religious expiation.
At common law, forfeitures were in the nature of a deodand."
Deodand literally means "to be given to God."'" Thus, property
or its value was given to the crown "with the belief that the king
would provide the money for masses to be said for the good of the
dead man's soul, or insure that the deodand was put to charitable
uses."'2 Even after the religious purposes of the deodand had en-
ded, the institution remained as a source of revenue for the crown
and a penalty for carelessness."
Although the concept of the deodand never became part of
American legal tradition,' civil forfeiture proceedings existed in
the colonies long before the adoption of the Constitution,2' and
were continued by the federal government almost immediately af-
ter its adoption. 7
and historical foundations of forfeiture); W. DURANT, STORY OF CIVILIZATION, Vol. 1, 328-
39 (1972) (historical perspective on development of Judaic Law).
'. See 7 TWELVE TABL.s 1, translated in 1 ScoTT, THE CIVIL LAW 69 (1932), reprinted in
GUIDE TO FORFEITURE, supra note 14, at 2 ("if a quadruped causes injury to anyone, let the
owner tender him the estimated amount of the damage; and if he is willing to accept it, the
owner shall . . . surrender the animal that caused the injury"). See generally W. DtRANr,
STORY OF CVIITZATION, Vol. 3 (1972) (historical perspective on development of Roman
law).
o See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974) (discussion
of biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian origins of civil forfeiture).
11 Id. See also 0. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAW 24-26 (1881), reprinted in GUIDE TO FORFEI-
TtuE, supra note 14, at 3 ("where a man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the
sword shall be forfeited as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner") (citing book writ-
ten in 1530 on the reign of Edward 1).
" Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16.
"Id.
" Id. at 681. See also 0. HoLMEs, supra note 21, at 5. Holmes discusses how legal prac-
tices remain even after the purpose for those practices disappear.
The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is
thought of which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of
things .... The old form receives new content, and in time even the form modifies
itself to fit the meaning which it has received.
Id. See generally Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-683 (discussing development of civil forfei-
ture); 3W. 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLSH LAW 68-71 (3d ed. 1927) (same).
" Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
" Id. at 683.
" Id. ("almost immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargo...
were made subject to forfeiture under federal law").
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B. Modern Civil Forfeiture Distinguished From Criminal Forfeiture
In modern forfeiture proceedings, the operation of two legal
fictions enables the civil forfeiture statutes to combat a myriad of
criminal activities. 8 The first fiction is that civil forfeiture is, gen-
erally,"" a proceeding in rem, directly against the property;80 the
guilt or innocence of the owner is irrelevant. 1 The second fiction
is known as the relation-back doctrine, Which dictates that forfei-
ture takes place at the time of the illegal act.5
a" See GUIDE To FORFEITURE, supra note 14, at 2 (for more than 200 years, Congress has
passed civil forfeiture statutes covering wide range of property). See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1988) (forfeiture of drug-related proceeds, conveyances, and real property); 19 U.S.C. §
1497 (1988) (forfeiture of undeclared imports); 18 U.S.C. § 492 (1988) (forfeiture of coun-
terfeiting paraphernalia); 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (forfeiture of illegally exported war mater-
ials); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988) (forfeiture of immoral articles); 33 U.S.C. §§ 384, 385 (1988)
(seizure of vessels used for piracy). See also Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1254-
55 n.4 (further examples of traditional civil forfeiture under federal law).
" See infra note 149 (New York civil forfeiture statute is in personam).
See United States v. $152,160.00 U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Colo.
1988) ("A civil forfeiture proceeding is an in rem action which proceeds on the legal fic-
tion that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing."); United States v. One Mercedes-
Benz 380 SEL VIN No. WDBCA33AIBB10331, 604 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
("basic nature of a forfeiture proceeding against vehicle is in rem, reflecting legal fiction
that the vehicle itself is guilty of facilitating crime"), affd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985). See
also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827) (proceeding in rem wholly unaf-
fected by criminal proceeding since property is offender).
" See United States v. Property Identified as 3120 Banneker Dr., 691 F. Supp. 497, 499
(D.D.C. 1988). "[Iln contrast to the criminal forfeiture laws, where conviction is a prereq-
uisite for forfeiture of the property . . .property is subject to civil forfeiture, even if its
owner is acquitted of - or never called to defend against - criminal charges." Id. (citing 21
U.S.C. § 853 (1988)). See also $152,160.00 U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. at 356 (conviction is
not prerequisite to civil forfeiture proceeding).
The issue in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding is whether the property was connected
to the illegality. See United States v. One 1980 Red Ferrari, VIN ZFFAA02A6A0032333,
875 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1989) ("federal forfeiture statute is in congruence with fourth
amendment because it requires a showing of probable cause" that property was used for
illicit purpose); United States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 722 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir.
1984) ("government's burden [under forfeiture statute] is to show probable cause for belief
that a substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited and a crime [as
defined by this section]"). See also United States v. $38,600.00 in U.S. Currency, 784 F.2d
694, 697 (5th Cir. 1986) (probable cause threshold in drug forfeiture case "is the same as
that which applies elsewhere: 'reasonable ground for the belief of guilt, supported by less
than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion' ") (quoting United States v.
$364,960 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)).
See 21 U.C. § 881(h) (1988) (codifying relation-back doctrine). The statute states:
"All right, title, and interest in property [subject to forfeiture] shall vest in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture ..... Id.
The relation-back doctrine has been applied in several instances to defeat innocent
owner standing. See Note, Civil Forfeiture, supra note 2, at 504-05 (discussing application of
relation-back doctrine). One case involved forfeiture of property used in a drug smuggling
149
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In contrast to civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture"3 is a proceed-
operation. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Property With Bldgs., Appurte-
nances and Improvements Known as the Rod and Reel Fish Camp, 660 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.
Miss.), af'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1987). The court declared that "forfeiture actually
occurs at the moment of the illegal use [and] [t]he condemnation when obtained relates
back to the time of the wrongful act and voids all intermediate sales ...." 660 F. Supp. at
487. Generally, illegal use immediately vests title to the property in the United States, and
no third party can acquire an interest in the property thereafter. See United States v.
$41,305.00 in Currency and Traveler's Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1546 (11 th Cir. 1986) (ille-
gal use immediately vests title in sovereign and cuts off rights of subsequent third parties).
The Supreme Court relied on the relation-back doctrine long before it was codified.
United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890). The Stowell Court announced that
"[florfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the
property then vests in the United States .... and the condemnation, when obtained, relates
back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations." Id. But see United
States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 2901 S.W. 118th Court, 683 F. Supp.
783, 787 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (rejecting relation-back doctrine). But cf. J.W. Goldsmith-Grant
Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921). "[W]hether the reason for [the relation-
back doctrine) be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial juris-
prudence of the country to be now displaced." Id.
The relation-back doctrine poses particularly difficult problems for bona fide purchasers,
mortgagees, assignees or other creditors who acquire an interest in property subsequent to
the illegal act. See United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property on Lake Forrest Circle,
870 F.2d 586, 594 (11 th Cir. 1989) (court disallowed attorney mortgages and judgment
creditor claims on real property); One Parcel of Real Estate Propert Known as Rod and Reel
Fish Camp, 660 F. Supp. at 486-87 (claimant's lease executed in 1984, but forfeiture oc-
curred in 1979 when illegal actions occurred, even though government did not seize prop-
erty until 1985). See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1276-78 (discussion
concerning whether lien holders, unsecured creditors, and subsequent purchasers qualify as
"owners" under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)).
"See 18 US.C. § 1963(a) (1988) (criminal forfeiture under Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (criminal forfeiture under Con-
tinuing Criminal Enterprise Act (CCE)).
The forfeiture provision of RICO states that any person who violates any provision of §
1962 shall forfeit:




(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection
in violation of section 1962.
Id. RICO prohibits four types of conduct: § 1962(a) prohibits investment of racketeering
proceeds in an interstate enterprise; § 1962(b) prohibits acquiring or maintaining an inter-
est in interstate activity through racketeering activity; § 1962(c) prohibits anyone from
conducting an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; § 1962(d)
prohibits anyone from conspiring to violate the preceding sections. Id.
In contrast to RICO, which seeks criminal forfeiture of criminal gains, the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise Act seeks criminal forfeiture of drug related gains. 21 U.S.C. § 853
150
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ing in personam directly against the defendant." The action may
proceed only upon conviction of the defendant."8 If the defendant
is found guilty, any property acquired or maintained through ille-
gality is subject to forfeiture."
Prosecutors generally prefer to proceed under civil rather than
criminal forfeiture statutes because of two advantages they offer. 7
First, the prosecutor's burden in a civil action is less stringent than
(1988). The CCE forfeiture provision provides in pertinent part:
Any person convicted of a violation [of this statute] . .. shall forfeit ...
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enter-
prise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to
any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against,
and property or contractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing
criminal enterprise.
Id. A continuing criminal activity is defined as leading five or more persons in committing a
continuing series of federal drug felonies which produce substantial income. 21 US.C. §
848(bX2) (1988).
" See United States v. $39,000.00 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1218 (10th
Cir. 1986) (criminal forfeiture is in personam action against person rather than thing, and
forfeiture is imposed as sanction); United States v. $152,160.00 U.S. Currency, 680 F.
Supp. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 1980) (criminal conviction not prerequisite for civil forfeiture
proceeding); United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (dis-
tinguishing characteristic of criminal forfeiture is that personal guilt of defendant is at is-
sue). See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1260, 1282-91 (discussing fed-
eral criminal forfeiture statute and rights of third parties); Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 Am. CRtm. L. Riv. 747, 748
(1985) (criminal forfeiture is in personam proceeding based on defendant's guilt).
" See $39,000.00 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d at 1218 (criminal forfeiture may be
ordered only if defendant convicted). See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 18
(1983) (after RICO conviction defendant forfeited interest in enterprise acquired in viola-
tion of statute); Schualfeldt, 657 F. Supp. at 387 (defendant's guilt is at issue in criminal
forfeiture proceeding).
" See Russello, 464 U.S. at 18 (after conviction under RICO, petitioner forfeited interest
in property acquired through illegal racketeering enterprise). See also Reed, supra note 34,
at 748 (same); Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1260 (after conviction any prop-
erty illegally acquired is subject to forfeiture).
Since third party claimants, such as mortgagees, are not parties to the action, they can-
not negotiate with the defendant for their property until the resolution of the criminal
proceeding. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1263-64. The criminal forfeiture
statutes prevent transfer of assets prior to conviction. See $39,000.00 in Canadian Currency,
801 F.2d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 1986). "To prevent the transfer of assets before a convic-
tion is obtained, the new criminal forfeiture. provisions of title 21 provide a substantial
means to freeze an individual's property upon or before the filing of an indictment." Id.
(footnote omitted).
"See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1262-63 (authors discuss advantages of
civil forfeiture to prosecution).
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in a criminal action." For example, under the federal civil forfei-
ture statute, once the government has established probable
cause" that the property is subject to forfeiture, the burden of
proof shifts to the party claiming innocent ownership to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claimant did not know of
or consent to the illegal activity." In a criminal proceeding the
burden remains on the prosecutor to prove each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt."1 In contrast, the burden of
proof under the New York statute varies, but is always below the
reasonable doubt standard." Second, civil forfeiture statutes make
available to the prosecutor all relevant discovery areas,", some of
which are not available in a criminal proceeding due to the consti-
- Id. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (comparing burden of proof in civil
forfeiture proceeding with burden of proof in criminal forfeiture proceeding).
" See United States v. Dickerson, 857 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988) (to reach proba-
ble cause government must pass point of mere suspicion); United States v. $38,600.00 in
U.S. Currency, 784 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1986) (probable cause is same for § 881(a) as
elsewhere: reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof,
but more than mere suspicion). See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1261
n.31 (discussing probable cause).
Probable cause is generally established by showing a "substantial connection" between
property and illicit activity. See, e.g., United States v. $38,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 816
F.2d 1538, 1548 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 722 F.2d
239, 244 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, VIN 9289200514,
709 F.2d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1983).
0 See, e.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence and Real Property Located at
900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 629 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (once government establishes
probable cause, burden of proof shifts to claimant to show by preponderance of evidence
that property is not subject to forfeiture); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at
11885 S.W. 46th St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (same); United States v. One
Parcel of Property Located at Route 1, Box 137, 743 F. Supp. 802, 805 (M.D. Ala. 1990)
(same). See also Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1261-62 (if government proves
probable cause, claimant to property must disprove allegations by preponderance of evi-
dence); Note, Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 2. at 475 (once probable cause is shown,
burden of proof shifts to claimant to show either absence of probable cause or applicability
of affirmative defense).
" See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr. JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8, at 58 (2d ed. 1986). "[T]he
prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crime
charged." Id. (footnote omitted).
See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1311 (3Xa) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (post-conviction forfei-
ture crimes require proof by preponderance of evidence); id. § 131 1(l)(b) (pre-conviction
forfeiture crimes require proof by clear and convincing evidence); id. § 1 311 (3)(bXii) (non-
criminal's knowledge of crime must be proven by preponderance of evidence); id. §
1311(3)(bXv) (specified felony offense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence for
real property instrumentality forfeiture).
" See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1263 n.36 (citing D. SMITH, PROSECMON
AND DEFENSE OF FORFErrmRE CAsES, § 1.01-.02 (1985)).
152
Civil Forfeiture
tutional protection against self-incrimination." Often, such dis-
covery will not only defeat the claimant's defenses, but will also
provide additional evidence that can be used in the criminal pros-
ecution of the violator of the statute."
II. CALERO-TOLEDO AND CIVIL FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)
The recent "war on drugs" prompted the federal government
to enact an array of forfeiture statutes." In the area of civil forfei-
ture, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.'
The original law subjected to forfeiture all controlled substances,
drug paraphernalia, and conveyances used to transport drugs."
The statute was enacted largely in response to a growing narcotics
industry, 4 after traditional criminal sanctions proved ineffective
due to the enormous financial benefits offered by the trade. 0
Congress now sought to attack the economic bases of the drug
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall be .. . compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." Id.
" See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1263 n.36 (citing D. SMrrH, PRosEctION
AND DrEFENSE oF FoRFErrtURE CAsEs, § 1.01-.02 (1985)).
4' See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known as 6 Patricia Dr., 705 F.
Supp. 710, 712-13 (D.R.I. 1989). "Among the increasingly powerful weapons in the fed-
eral government's arsenal for waging its escalating war on drug trafficking in the United
States are the mechanisms of civil and criminal forfeiture." Id. Through civil forfeiture
statutes Congress has expanded the war on drugs to every physical object involved in the
narcotics industry. United States v. 3120 Banneker Drive, 691 F. Supp. 497, 503 (D.D.C.
1988). As a result, the number of seizures and forfeitures has increased dramatically over
the last six years. Winn, supra note 2, at 1111 (1988). A government program was imple-
mented to manage these asset forfeitures in response to this rapid increase in seizures. See
Legal Times, Aug. 27, 1990, at 4, col. 1-2.
4 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 51 l(a), 84 Stat. 1242, 1276
(1970).
" Id. The law was subsequently amended to include forfeiture of proceeds from drug
transactions and real property used to facilitate such transactions. See supra note I (perti-
nent statutory provisions).
" See Stopping "Mother Ships"-A Loophole in Drug Enforcement: Hearing on S.3437 Before the
Subcormr. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 42 (1978) [hereinafter Mother Ships] (statement of Peter B. Bensinger). "We recog-
nize that the conviction and incarceration of top-level traffickers does not necessarily dis-
rupt trafficking organizations; the acquisition of vast capital permits regrouping and the
incarcerated trafficker can continue to direct operations." Id. See generally Goldsmith &
Linderman, supra note 2, at 1254-56 (discussing forfeiture as effective way to combat nar-
cotics trafficking and racketeering).
" See Mother Ships, supra note 49, at 42 (traditional criminal sanctions ineffective against
lucrative narcotics industry).
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industry. 1
Soon after the passage of the civil forfeiture statute, an ancillary
problem arose: innocent owners, who neither knew of nor con-
sented to the drug-related activity, found their property being
subjected to forfeiture.53 Such was typical among owners whose
property was stolen 8 or who had leased, rented or loaned their
property to others engaged in illegal activity." Historically, the
only remedies available to the innocent owner were the adminis-
trative proceedings of remission and mitigation,"6 which were not
statutory defenses but purely matters of administrative grace."
In 1974, the Supreme Court addressed the innocent owner
problem in civil forfeiture proceedings."' In Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
"' See id. "Therefore, it is essential to attack the finances that are the backbone of organ-
ized drug traffickers." Id. See also supra note 6 (federal government's civil forfeiture statute
strikes at profits of illicit trafficking in controlled substances).
" See One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir.
1986) (traditionally, innocence of owner is not defense). See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974) (innocence of owner of property subject to
forfeiture almost uniformly rejected as defense); United States v. One 1977 Cherokee Jeep,
VIN J7AI7MP1 16712, 639 F.2d 212, 213 (5th Cir. 1981) (forfeiture upheld despite inno-
cence of owner). See also supra notes 30-31 (nature of in rem proceeding).
" See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. The Court stated that "it would be difficult to
reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been
taken from him without his privity or consent." Id.
" See, e.g., United States v. One 1972 Toyota Mark 11, 505 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th Cir.
1974) (innocence of owner who allowed vehicle to be used for drug offense is no defense to
forfeiture action); United States v. One 1973 Pontiac Grand Am, 413 F. Supp. 163, 165
(W.D. Tx. 1976) (innocence of owner does not justify remission of forfeiture of vehicle
used in violation of narcotics laws); United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe Automobile,
364 F. Supp. 745, 748 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (claimant, who gave car to son as gift, is only "nomi-
nal" owner of car and does not have sufficient ownership to be considered innocent
owner).
- See 21 U.S.C. J 881(d) (1988). This provision indicates that remission and mitigation,
"may be authorized ... by the Attorney General." Id. However, there is no legal right to
remission of a civil forfeiture; it is purely a matter of grace. See United States v. Morris, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat) 246, 291 (1825) (no absolute right to remission exists); GUIDE TO FoRFEI-
TURE, supra note 14, at 261 (same). See, e.g., United States v. One 1958 Pontiac Sedan, 308
F.2d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1962) (remission discretionary).
Prior to the development of a constitutional standard of innocent ownership espoused in
Calero-Toledo and the first amendment to the statutes in 1978, an innocent owner could
only recover forfeited property through remission of the forfeiture. See Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301, 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (1978). Cf. Morris 23 U.S. at
291 (equitable relief of remission presupposes that offense has been committed).
" See GUIDE TO FoRFErURE, supra note 14, at 34 (owner's innocence or ignorance is not
defense in federal forfeiture action; remission, however, may be granted but it is not legal
right).
" See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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son Yacht Leasing Co.," Pearson Yacht Company leased a yacht to
two residents of Puerto Rico." The yacht was seized pursuant to a
Puerto Rican statute modeled after 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4)," when
one marihuana cigarette was found on board. 1 The Supreme
Court upheld the seizure even though the owners, who were not
involved with the commission of the crime, never received notice
of the forfeiture or an opportunity to be heard." The Court cited
two policy reasons to support the forfeiture:63 first, civil forfeit-
ures have punitive and deterrent purposes," and second, such for-
feitures induce innocent owners to exercise greater care in trans-
ferring possession of their property."
Although the innocence of an owner was not traditionally a de-
fense to an in rem forfeiture proceeding," the Calero-Toledo
Court did recognize constitutional protections for innocent own-
ers in certain circumstances. 7 An owner would be protected in a
situation where the owner had done "all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of [the] property."" This
" Id.
" See id. at 665.
" See id.; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(aX4) (1979). The statute provides: "All convey-
ances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels, which are used, or are intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession,
or concealment of property [shall be forfeited to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico]." See
Calero-Toiedo, 416 U.S. at 686 n.25 (discussing statute).
11 See Calero-Tokdo, 416 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "lS~o far as we know only
one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht." Id.
"Id. at 67940. The Court held that "this case presents an 'extraordinary' situation in
which postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny due process."
Id.
Id. at 686.
"Id. See gmerally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1255-56 (forfeiture is effec-
tive weapon against narcotics trafficking since traditional criminal sanctions have not de-
terred drug dealers).
"See Calero-Toedo, 416 U.S. at 688. Cf. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S.
505, 507 (1921) (nothing unreasonable with requiring owner of property to make sure it is
not used for illegal purposes).
"See supra note 52 (innocence not traditionally defense to forfeiture).
See Calkr-Toedo, 416 U.S. at 688-89 (citing Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347,
364 (1808)). For example, "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an
owner whose property" was stolen and then subject to illegal use. Id. at 689. The Court
points out that other cases also support this proposition. See also Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254
U.S. at 512 (judgment reserved as to whether forfeiture extends to property stolen from
owner or taken without consent); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S.
321, 333 (1926) (same); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926) (same).
" Calto-Toedo, 416 U.S. at 689. The Court suggested in dicta that if the owner was
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"reasonable precaution" standard," sometimes called a "negli-
gence" standard 7 0 is widely considered dicta,'7  but has been ap-
plied as substantive law by many courts.7 In fact, the "reasonable
precaution" language of Calero-Toledo is the only guidance that
the Supreme Court has given regarding the constitutional rights
of innocent owners.7 8
Congress has indicated its concern for innocent owners through
the enactment of innocent owner defenses in three amendments
to the Controlled Substances Act.7 ' The Psychotropic Substances
unaware of and uninvolved in the wrongful activity, and did all that could reasonably be
expected to prevent the activity, there might be a constitutional claim of innocent owner-
ship. Id.
" See Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil For-
feiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REv. 165, 188-93 (1990) (comparing "reasonable precau-
tion" standard to actual knowledge standard).
" See United States v. Premises Known as 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979,
993 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (discussing whether statute requires owner lack actual knowledge only
or also knowledge that could have been acquired through non-negligent conduct). See also
Note, supra note 69, at 188-89 (discussing actual knowledge standard).
" See, e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing dicta in Calero-Toledo whereby innocent owner may have defense to civil action),
cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); Strafer, Civil Forfeitures: Protecting the Innocent Owner,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 841, 846 (1985) (same); Note, Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 2, at
488 (same).
Even if the Court did not intend to expressly adopt this standard, it seems to follow from
the Court's language that if the leasing company had done all that could reasonably be
expected to avoid having the property put to illegal use, it would have a valid constitutional
claim. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 690.
" See, e.g., 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879 (using Calero-Toledo test as standard for deter-
mining consent under 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX7)); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate,
715 F. Supp. 355, 357-58 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (to maintain innocent owner defense under §
881 (a)(7) owner must not have known of illegal use and must have taken every reasonable
precaution to prevent it); United States v. One 1978 Chrysler Le Baron Station Wagon,
648 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (defendant must prove he did all that could
reasonably be expected to prevent proscribed use); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln
Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383, 1391 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (reasonableness standard determined
by individual circumstances of case); United States v. One 1973 Jaguar Coupe. 431 F.
Supp. 128, 130 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Calero-Toledo left door open for possible affirmative
defense that reasonable precaution taken).
" See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S at 689.
" See Psychotropic Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777
(1978) (forfeiting proceeds from drug transactions except when act of commission or omis-
sion is without knowledge or consent of owner) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX6) (1988));
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat. 2040, 2050 (1984)
(forfeiting real property used to facilitate drug transactions except when act of commission
or omission is without knowledge or consent of owner) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX7)
(1988); Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 100-690, § 6059(b) (1988), 102 Stat. 4323, 4324
(1988) (amending 21 US.C. § 881(aX4) to exclude conveyances from forfeiture when act of
commission or omission was without knowledge, consent or willful blindness of owner)
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Act of 1978"' expanded the civil forfeiture statute to provide for
forfeiture of proceeds related to drug activity." The Act how-
ever, included a defense which protected an owner from forfei-
ture if he or she could establish that the illicit act occurred "with-
out the knowledge or consent of that owner."" In 1984, Congress
further expanded the scope of § 881 (a) by adding subsection (a)(7)
which provided for the forfeiture of real property.78 Using lan-
guage identical to that of subsection (a)(6), subsection (a)(7) also
provided an innocent owner defense.7' Finally, in 1988, Congress
amended subsection (a)(4) by adding an innocent owner defense to
the provision which already authorized the forfeiture of convey-
ances used in drug activity." That addition differed from the in-
nocent owner provisions of (a)(6) and (a)(7) in that it included the
requirement that the claimant establish a lack of "willful blind-
ness" to the drug activity.8
A. Interpreting the Innocent Owner Provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)
Although the innocent owner defenses are essentially the same
in each subsection, 82 the language has not been interpreted con-
sistently. In construing the statute, the first question is whether
(codified as 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4XC) (1988)).
" See Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768
(codified as 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX6) (1988)). This statute amends the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act and provides for forfeiture of property that is traceable
to all proceeds of narcotics exchange. Id.
" 21 U.S.C. § 881 (aX6) (1988). See supra note I (text of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (aX6)).
" 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) (1988). See supra note 1 (text of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (aX6)); supra note
12 (discussion of affirmative defense).
1" See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 306, 309,
518, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as 21 US.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). See supra note 1 (pertinent
statutory provisions).
" See supra note 1 (pertinent statutory provisions); supra note 12 (discussion of affirma-
tive defense).
0 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5015, 102 Stat. 4324 (codi-
fied as 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX4XC) (1988)). The statute now provides in pertinent part: "with-
out the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." See supra note I (text of §
88 1(aX4)(C)).
8- 21 US.C. § 881(aX4XC) (1988). See supra note 1 (text of subsection a). See infra notes
122-24 and accompanying text (discussion of willful blindness).
" See supra note I (pertinent statutory provisions); supra note 12 (discussion of affirma-
tive defense).
" See, e.g., United States v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1990)
(government must show probable cause that property seized was used or intended to be
used in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)); United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870,
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the phrase "without the knowledge or consent of that owner"
should be read conjuctively or disjunctively." Some courts have
held that the phrase should be read conjunctively, requiring the
claimant to prove both lack of knowledge of the illegal activity
and lack of consent to it.ss Other courts have read the clause dis-
junctively, allowing an innocent owner to establish either lack of
knowledge of the drug activity or the absence of consent to it."
Perhaps the strongest voice for the conjunctive school is that of
Judge Greenberg of the Third Circuit.8 In United States v. Parcel
of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Road," the government
brought a forfeiture action under § 881(a)(7)9' and the majority
878-79 (2d Cir. 1990) (claimant must do all that could reasonably be expected to prevent
illegal use), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. One Single'Family Resi-
dence With Out Bldgs., 894 F.2d 1511, 1516 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (statute intended to penalize
only those significantly involved); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known as
6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989) (innocent owner status proven by pre-
ponderance of evidence that illegal use occurred without knowledge or consent); United
States v. One 1985 Nissan 300ZX, VIN JNIC214SFX069854, 889 F.2d 1317, 1320 (4th
Cir. 1989) (subjective standard used to determine innocent owner status); United States v.
One Parcel of Real Property with Bldgs. Appurtenances, and Improvements Known As
190 Colebrook Rd., 743 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D.R.I. 1990) (innocent owners must show ab-
sence of knowledge or consent and that property was purchased in good faith); United
States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less With Improvements, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1418-19 (N.D.
Ala. 1990) (owner must prove absence of either "consent" or "knowledge" by preponder-
ance of evidence).
" See United States v. All Right, Title, and Interest in Property and Premises Known As
710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). "[F]irst, however, we must answer a
threshold question ... must a claimant prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent,
or can the defense survive if only one of the two elements is proven?" Id. See also Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) (starting point of statutory construction is lan-
guage of statute).
See United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 890 Noyac Rd.,
739 F. Supp. 111, 115-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (phrase should be construed to read without
knowledge and without consent). See also Note, Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 2, at
n.64 (citations of cases which follow conjunctive reading of innocent owner defenses).
s See e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) (claimant
may show either lack of knowledge or lack of consent), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991);
United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d
Cir. 1989) (same); Sixty Acres, 727 F. Supp. at 1418-19 (same); United States v. Real Prop-
erty Known as 19026 Oakmont S. Drive, 715 F. Supp. 233, 237 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1989)(same); United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 171-02 Liberty
Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same). See generally Note, Innocent Owner De-
fense, supra note 2, at 478-86 (discussion of whether statute should be read disjunctively or
conjunctively).
s7 See United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659
(3d Cir. 1989) (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (petition for rehearing).
- 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 626.
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of the court read the language of the defense disjunctively.' 0
Judge Greenberg's dissent stated that the plain meaning of the
statute required a conjunctive reading.'1 In further support of his
dissent, Judge Greenberg cited the ordinary canons of statutory
construction, 9 the legislative history of the statute s9 and the fact
that Congress, if it wanted the claimant to have two possibilities
by which to defeat forfeiture, could have written "without knowl-
edge or without consent."94
By contrast, the court in United States v. Certain Real Property
and Premises Known as 171-02 Liberty Avenue," which was the first
to consider the statutory construction of "or,"" read the phrase
"without knowledge or consent" disjunctively.' 7 The Liberty Ave-
nue court also relied on the ordinary canons of statutory construc-
tion," and the ability of Congress to have drafted the statute as
"without knowledge and consent.""9 In addition, other courts
have cited the legislative history of § 881(a) in support of a dis-
junctive reading.'" That history indicates that Congress wished to
expand statutory protections for innocent owners, as well as to ex-
pand the government's power to seize drug assets.10'
Perhaps more importantly, to require a claimant to disprove
knowledge in all cases renders the element of consent irrele-
" See id.
" United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659,
660 (3d Cir. 1989) (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (petition for rehearing).
"Id.
" Id. at 663.
"o Id. at 662-63.





I See, e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) (legislative
history supports disjunctive reading), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v.
Parcel of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir.1989)
(same); United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less with Improvements, 727 F. Supp. 1414,
1419 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (relying on 6901 Grubb Rd. and Liberty Ave.).
lei See 141st SL Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 ("Congress intended forfeiture to be powerful
weapon in the war on drugs"); One Single Family Residence, 894 F.2d at 1513 (two aims of
Congress were to expand war on drugs and protect innocent owners); Parcel of Real Prop-
erty Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 624 (Congress enacted § 881 to attack drug
trafficking). See also Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1254 (forfeiture is important
weapon in war on drugs).
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vant.10 2 Read conjunctively, once there is knowledge the defense
fails, and therefore the consent element becomes surplusage.1 3
Finally, the general goal of the forfeiture statute's amendments is
to expand the government's reach in drug cases,'" yet the specific
goal of the innocent owner defense is to temper the harsh results
imposed on innocent owners under the statute.105 It is submitted
that a disjunctive reading of the statute is consistent with both
goals, while a conjunctive reading is consistent with only the first.
B. Defining Knowledge Under the Innocent Owner Provisions of 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)
Courts have also struggled in determining when a claimant has
knowledge of the illegal use of the property.'" In 1985, the Court
10 See Note, Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 2, at 485. "A disjunctive interpretation
allows each term [in statute] independent significance." Id.
I d. at 485-86 n.95 (citing Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577
F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1978)). See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1955) (courts should "'give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,'
rather than emasculate an entire section") (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)); Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d at 673 ("statutes should not be construed so as
to make mere surplusage of any [included] provisions"); Klein v. Republic Steel Corp., 435
F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1970) (all words and provisions of statute should be given effect and
not construed as surplusage); 2A N. SnGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcrION §
46.06 (1984) (statute should be construed so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous,
void or insignificant).
104 See supra note 101 (cases citing congressional purpose).
, See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) (Congress did
not intend for innocent owners to lose their property), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991);
United States v. One Single Family Residence With Out Bldgs., 894 F.2d 1511, 1513 (1 1th
Cir. 1990) (twin aims of Congress were to expand war on drugs and protect innocent own-
ers); United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618,
624 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
IN See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive,
897 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1990) (claimant's bare denial of knowledge insufficient to pre-
clude summary judgment due to evidence tending to show actual knowledge); United
States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1987) (owner on notice of illegal
actor's connection to vehicle); United States v. $4,255,000.00, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (1 1th
Cir. 1985) (innocent owner defense based on actual, not constructive knowledge), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. 8848 South Commercial St., 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12200 at 37-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("[fIf the
evidence supports a 'reasonable inference' of actual knowledge and the claimant fails to
come forward within anything more than a naked protestation that he or she really didn't
know of the illicit activity, the claimant's defense of innocent ownership fails."). See also
United States v. 14 1st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 876 (2d Cir. 1990) (actual knowledge im-
puted to owner by his agent), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. Real
Property Located at 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (knowledge
exists when innocent owner cannot prove lack of knowledge or reason to know). But see
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of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of
knowledge in United States v. $4,255,000.00,107 and held that "the
statutory 'innocent owner' defense turns on the claimant's actual,
not constructive knowledge."" Although most courts have fol-
lowed this determination,'" they have not clearly addressed what
standard should be used when determining whether there is ac-
tual knowledge. 0 Although one court has stated that the stan-
dard is subjective,"' several recent court decisions strongly indi-
cate a trend toward an objective standard.""
In United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 2901
S.W. 118th Court,113 the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida held that a claimant's conclusory assertions of lack of
knowledge were insufficient to overcome objective evidence which
tended to show awareness of the drug-related activity.11 In United
United States v. Buti Lounge, Inc., 1988 WL 40794 at 2 (N.D. 11. April 22, 1988)
(Westlaw, AIlfeds library) (denied government's motion for summary judgment because
only evidence presented to show knowledge of drug transaction by corporation was man-
ager-agent relationship).
762 F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
I id. at 906 n.24.
im See United States v. Premises Described as Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295,
1299 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (claimant must prove absence of actual knowledge); United States
v. All That Lot of Ground Known as 2511 E. Fairmount Ave., 722 F. Supp. 1273, 1281
(D. Md. 1989) (claimant's responsibility to prove absence of actual knowledge); United
States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Located on Fellows Tracts C, D, E, and F of Pine Island
Estates, 715 F. Supp. 360, 362 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (innocent owner defense turns on claimant's
actual knowledge); United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 2901 S.W.
118th Court, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (claimants must show absence of ac-
tual knowledge).
11 See Note, Innocent Owner Defmse, supra note 2, at 487 (courts have given inconsistent
answers to questions of what is needed to establish consent).
" See United States v. $10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233, 235 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987)
("plain language of § 881 (aX6) ... does not impose an objective standard" (adopting Elev-
enth Circuit's holding in United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986)). See generally Note, supra note 69, at 188-96 (recommending
actual knowledge standard over negligence knowledge standard derived from Calero-
Toledo).
"I See, e.g., United States v. $4,255,000.00, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (suffi-
cient evidence must be presented to support inference of actual knowledge), cert denied,
474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 2301 Caughey
Rd., 715 F. Supp. 131, 133-35 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (absence of specific actual knowledge insuf-
ficient to support defense in light of knowledge of general circumstances). See also Strafer,
Civil Forfetures: Protecting The Innocent Owner, 37 U. FLA. L. Ray. 841, 847 (1985) (claimant
who does not suspect illicit use of property has no affirmative duty to act).
i 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
114 Id. at 788-89.
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States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive,""' pursuant to a § 881(a)(7) forfei-
ture, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the
claimant's innocent owner defense where there was "simply no
probative evidence ... from which a reasonable jury could find
for the claimant, given the cocaine found throughout the house,
the gun and other drug paraphernalia found in common areas of
the house . "11... , The court further stated that "[i]n view of
appellant's failure to come forward with any evidence to support
her assertions that she had no knowledge of drug trafficking from
her residence," her defense must fail.' 17 Moreover, in United States
v. One 1980 Red Ferrari,"" the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that where the "circumstantial evidence of knowl-
edge is compelling," the claimant cannot avoid forfeiture without
more than mere assertions of ignorance.'1 ' These holdings indi-
cate that a claimant faced with objective evidence which contra-
dicts assertions of lack of knowledge must put forth other objec-
tive evidence to prove lack of knowledge.1 0
Evidence that Congress also envisioned an objective standard to
determine the presence or absence of knowledge in the statutory
defense is found in the most recent amendment to § 881(a)."'
Subsection (4)(C), added to the statute in 1988, provides that the
affirmative defense is not available to the claimant who lacked
knowledge through "willful blindness.""'12 This amendment
evinces congressional awareness that the innocent owner defense
should not be available to those who purposefully close their eyes,
at least where conveyances are concerned." 3 The objective stan-
897 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990).
I1 d. at 102.
:IT Id.
s 827 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 479.
't See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (cases using objective evidence to de-
termine knowledge).
ISI 21 US.C. § 881(aX4XC) (1988). See supra note 1 (text of statutory provision).
15 21 US.C. § 881(aX4XC) (1988). See supra note I (text of statutory provision).
See 134 CONG. Rzc 16,025 (1988) (Senate debate noting disallowance of innocent
owner defenses where willful blindness exists).
Courts are also aware that willful blindness should not be a defense. See, e.g., United
States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 5745 110th St., 721 F. Supp. 287, 290 (S.D. Fla.
1989). The court stated that, in the face of overwhelming evidence of actual knowledge,
'deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge is equivalent to knowledge." Id. Cf. infra note
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dard is reasonable in that it defeats the claim of one who actually
knew of the illegal activity but later claims a lack of purely "sub-
jective" knowledge. "'
C. The Standard of Consent Applied to the Innocent Owner Provisions
of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)
When a claimant raises an innocent owner defense, a court
which reads the innocent owner defense disjunctively must next
determine whether the claimant consented to the illegal activ-
ity.'" Although most courts inevitably invoke the "reasonable
precaution" standard established in Calero-Toledo and avoid the
consent issue, 3 several courts have rejected the "reasonable pre-
caution" standard.1 27 Still others have applied knowledge and con-
124 (11 th Circuit discussing willful blindness).
t" See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 494 (11th Cir. 1984) (actions
.point(ing] in the direction of deliberate ignorance" lead to inference of knowledge (quot-
ing United States v. Batencourt, 592 F.2d 916, 918 (5th Cir. 1979)).
I" See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1990), ce. dmied,
111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991). To date, 141st SL Co". has been the only attempt to establish a
standard of consent; that standard is the constitutionally minimum "reasonable precau-
tion" standard of Calero-Toledo. Id. See also Note, Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 2, at
486-92 (discussing consent).
" See, e.g., 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying Colero-ToLkdo
as standard for consent), cert. denied, 1 I1 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. One Parcel of
Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46th St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (claimant must
show "she did not know of the property's connection to the drug trafficking, and that she
took every reasonable precaution to prevent the property's use in drug trafficking");
United States v. One Single Family Residence with Outbuildings Located at 15621 S.W.
209th Ave., 699 F. Supp. 1531, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same), afrd, 894 F.2d 1511 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108,
110 (S.D. Tex. 1988) ("The innocent owner defense applies only to owners who can show
that they did not know and had no reason to know of the illegal use; were uninvolved in
the illegal use; and did all that could reasonably be expected to preclude or discover the
illegal use."); United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property Containing 30.80 Acres, More
or Less, 665 F. Supp. 422, 425 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (section 881(aX7 ), innocent owner de-
fense, "fully comports" with Court's reasoning in Calro-Toledo), affid sub nora. United
States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988). But see United States v. Lots 12, 13. 14,
and 15, Keeton Heights Subdivision, 869 F.2d 942, 946-47 (6th Cir. 1989) (rejecting appli-
cation of Calro-Toledo); United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less, 727 F. Supp. 1414,
1420-21 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (CaLero-Toledo does not apply to section 881(aX7) (citing United
States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6901 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 627 (3d Cir.
1989)); United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(CaLero-Toledo test is inapplicable when innocent owner defense is being claimed under 21
U.S.C. § 881(aX7) (1988)).
,2 See, e.g., Lots 12, 13, 14, and 15 Keeton Heights Subdivxion, 869 F.2d at 946-47 (re-
jecting application of "reasonable precaution" standard established in Calero-Toledo); Sixty
Acres, 727 F. Supp. at 1420 (Calero-Toledo does not apply to section 881(aX7)); Certain Real
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sent as the first and second prong of an innocent owner defense
analysis and the Calero-Toledo dicta as the third prong.1" In any
case, these courts did not attempt to establish a workable standard
for determining the absence or presence of consent.'"
Recently, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the standard for consent is the constitutionally minimum
"reasonable precaution" standard for innocent ownership estab-
lished in Calero-Toledo: whether the claimant did all that could
reasonably be expected to prevent the illicit use of the prop-
erty. 0 In United States v. 141st Street Corp.,- the government
sought forfeiture of a six story apartment building on the grounds
that it was being used to facilitate the distribution of narcotics .1 3
Relying on § 881(a)(7), the owner sought to avoid forfeiture by
arguing that it neither knew of nor consented to the narcotic ac-
tivity.108 Since the court read "knowledge or consent" disjunc-
Property, 724 F. Supp. at 914 (same). See generally Note, Innocent Owner Defense, supra note
2, at 489 (discussion of various applications of Calero-Toledo standard).
in See, e.g., One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46 St., 715 F. Supp. at 358 (claimant
must show that "she did not know of the property's connection to drug trafficking, and
that she took every reasonable precaution to prevent the property's use in drug traffick-
ing"); Real Property Located At 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. at 110 ("[T]he innocent owner
defense applies only to owners who can show that they did not know and had no reason to
know of the illegal use; were uninvolved in the illegal use; and did all that could reasonably
be expected to preclude or discover the illegal use.") (citing United States v. One Boeing
707 Aircraft, 750 F.2d 1280, 1289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985)); Two
Tracts of Real Property Containing 30.80 Acres, More or Less, 665 F. Supp. at 425 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (section (aX7) innocent owner defense "fully comports" with Court's reasoning in
Calero-Toledo).
I' See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879-80 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
t 141st SL Corp., 911 F.2d at 87980.
151 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
15 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 873.
I d. at 874. Realty Corporation was the owner of record and Mark Hersh was its presi-
dent and principal stockholder. Id. at 873. Hersh's uncle was the superintendent of the
building, although in many ways he acted as the managing agent. Id. Pursuant to many
complaints about drug trafficking in the building, the New York City Police contacted the
uncle on three occasions and attempted to contact Hersh, who responded neither to calls
nor letters. Id. Suspecting that Hersh might be aware of the drug activity in the building,
the police decided not to attempt further contacts with Hersh. Id. After several undercover
purchases of narcotics, the officers obtained a seizure warrant for the entire building by
applying ex parte to the United States Magistrate as authorized by the statute. Id. See gener-
ally 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988) (forfeiture procedure).
Realty Corporation asserted an innocent owner defense, stating that it neither knew of
nor consented to the narcotics activity. Id. at 874. However, since Hersh's uncle, who had
been contacted by the police on at least three occasions, was aware of the allegations of
164
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tively,'" the determinative issue became whether the claimant
consented.1 " Adopting the language of Calero-Toledo, the court
stated that consent would exist if the claimant failed to do "all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal activity
once he learned of it." 1 " The court found that consent existed
since the owner had disregarded police notices concerning drug
activity in the building and had not otherwise done all that it rea-
sonably could to prevent the drug trafficking.137 In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied upon a three part analysis.
First, the court stated that although the statute's legislative his-
tory made no mention of Calero-Toledo, that fact alone did not
preclude its application.'" It is submitted that although the legis-
lative history makes no reference to Calero-Toledo, that fact alone
does not compel the incorporation of the "reasonable precaution"
standard any more than it compels a rejection of that standard.
This use of legislative history is inappropriate in light of canons of
statutory construction which dictate that unless Congress explic-
itly redefined a word in the statute, its ordinary usage should
prevail.139
Second, the court concluded that the Calero-Toledo standard
provided a proper balance between the competing policy objec-
tives of § 881(a), which are to make drug trafficking expensive for
the traffickers and to preserve the property of the innocent
owner. "1 0 It is submitted that the "reasonable precaution" stan-
dard does not provide an adequate balance between these policy
objectives since it favors the goal of attacking the growing drug
industry at the expense of the statute's innocent owner
protections. " "
drug activity, his knowledge was imputed to Realty Corporation. Id. The court affirmed
the district court decision and held that an owner has consented when he fails to do all that
could reasonably be expected to prevent illicit use of the property. Id. at 878.
I Id.
I d. at 876-80.
tu 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
Id. at 879-80.
" Id. at 879.
t See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947). "[WJords of statutes... should be
interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses." Id.; Old Colony R. Co. v.
Commissioner. 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932) (same).
, See 141st SL Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
14* See, e.g., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF Trrzs II AND III, 124 CONG. Rmc 17,647,
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Finally, the court determined that the "reasonable precaution"
standard is appropriate since consent is "more than a state of
mind." '4 It is submitted that although the court was correct in
concluding that consent is "more than a state of mind," it does
not necessarily follow that "failure to take reasonable precaution"
is determinative of consent. Rather, this Note proposes that con-
sent requires an owner to exercise a degree of willfulness which is
not necessary under a "reasonable precaution" standard. Consent,
in its ordinary usage, involves an affirmative act of the will, accom-
panied by deliberation. " 8 In contrast, the "reasonable precau-
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 9496, 9522. (accompanying Psychotropic
Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301, 92 Stat. 3768, 3777). The report
discusses the scope of the statute's innocent owner protections:
Specifically the property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such
property knew or consented to the fact that:
1. the property was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a con-
trolled substance in violation of the law,
2. the property was proceeds traceable to such an illegal exchange, or
3. the property was used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of Federal
illicit drug laws.
Id. Floor debate in both chambers indicates an awareness of the purpose of the innocent
owner provisions. "[The amendment] expands the rights of innocent parties who own...
the seized property, to assert their claim in court... by establishing that the illicit use of
the property was without their knowledge or consent." 124 CONG. Rzc. 36,946 (1978)
(statements of Rep. Rogers). "(A] bona fide party who has no knowledge or consent to the
property he owns having been derived from an illegal transaction, that party would be able
to establish that fact under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur." 124 CONG.
Rm 23,057 (1978) (statements of Sen. Nunn, sponsor of amendment).
The innocent owner provision of the 1984 amendment, which extended the statute's
reach to real property, was intended to be the same as the 1978 amendment. See S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 3182, 3398
(accompanying Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98
Stat. 2040, 2050). "[Tlhe amendment includes an 'innocent owner' exception like that now
included in those provisions permitting the civil forfeiture of certain vehicles and moneys
or securities." Id. See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 2, at 1259 (§ 881(a)
does not adequately protect third party interests).
I" 141st St Corp., 911 F.2d at 879. Although the court did not discuss what it meant by
"a state of mind," it seemed to suggest that the claimant cannot sit idly by while drug
activity takes place before his eyes, and subsequently claim lack of consent. See id.
I" See BLAcx's LAW DICroNARY 305 (6th ed. 1990) (consent is "concurrence of wills");
RwrATEMENT (SiwND) oy TOaRS § 892 (1979). The RESTATEmENT provides:
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by ac-
tion or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.
Id. See also United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro Z-28, No. 85-6348 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (held claimant does not have to act affirmatively to prohibit illegal use of property
unless there are apparent reasons to suspect illegality). But see Note, Civil Forfeiture, supra
note 2, at 502-03 (critical of One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro); United States v. Sixty Acres, 727
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tion" standard encompasses carelessness and inattentiveness which
are not affirmative acts.14 4 In addition, since 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)
did not include any innocent owner provisions when Calero-Toledo
was decided,1"6 for courts to now apply the "reasonable precau-
tion" dicta of Calero-Toledo after the innocent owner amendments
is to impose the will of the courts over the express intent of
Congress.
III. CIVIL FORFEITURE UNDER NEW YORK'S CPLR ARTICLE 13-A
Article 13-A of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, which
subjects instrumentalities and proceeds of drug transactions to
forfeiture, differs from 21 U.S.C. § 881 in two fundamental
ways. 4' First, the statute applies to the fruits of all felony
crimes," 7 although a major reason for enacting the law was the
F. Supp. 1414, 1420 (N.D. Ala. 1990) ("Congress had a little more in mind when it used
the word 'consent' in § 881(aX7 )").
I" See United States v. One Mercedes Benz 300 SEL, 604 F. Supp. 1307, 1309, 1311
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985). For example, an owner who lends his
car to a friend for safekeeping has not taken every reasonable precaution to ensure that
the car is not used in drug-related activity; the owner could have stored the car in a garage.
Id. However, the owner did not willfully consent to the proscribed use of his car by lending
it to his friend. Id.
HS See supra note 74 (first innocent owner defense amendment to statute in 1978).
"5See N.Y. Civ. Pa c L. & R. § 1311 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Section 1311 (1) states:
A civil action may be commenced by the appropriate claiming authority against a
criminal defendant to recover the property which constitutes the proceeds of a
crime, the substituted proceeds of a crime, an instrumentality of a crime or the real
property instrumentality of a crime or to recover a money judgment in amount
equivalent in value to the property which constitutes the proceeds of a crime, the
substituted proceeds of a crime, an instrumentality of a crime, or the real property
instrumnentality of a crime provided, however, that a judgment predicated upon [an
action against a non-criminal defendant relating to an instrumentality of a crime]
shall be limited to the amount of the proceeds of the crime .... "
Id. (emphasis added to language which became effective November 1, 1990).
The version of the statute which was in force since 1984 was the same as above except it
did not provide for forfeiture of real property instrumentalities. See generally 2A J. Wan-
srm, H. KORN, & A. Mil a, NEw Yoit CIVmL PRAcnc 1 1310.01 (1989) [hereinafter Naw
YoRK CIVIL PRACTICm) (Article 13-A is powerful tool against criminal activity); Kessler, Quo
Vadis? Assessing New York's Civil Forfeiture Law, 4 Touuo L. Rav. 253, 254-57 (1988) (Article
13-A greatly expands scope of forfeiture in New York).
I' See, e.g., Kuriansky v. Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 App. Div. 2d 160, 163, 525
N.Y.S.2d 225, 228-29 (2d Dep't 1988) (forfeiture of proceeds from fraudulent Medicaid
scheme); Dillon v. Morgan Oil Terminals Corp., 138 Misc. 2d 135, 136, 523 N.Y.S.2d 719,
721 (Nassau County Ct. 1987) (tractor trailer and corporation itself forfeited as instrumen-
tality of grand larceny); Holtzman v. Bailey, 132 Misc. 2d 25, 26, 503 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1986) (automobile fnrfeited as instrumentality of drunk driving);
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enormity of New York's drug problem. " 8 Second, actions under
13-A are in personam rather than in rem,14 ' allowing claiming au-
thorities"50 to receive a judgment against the personal assets of an
offender. 1 This in personam characteristic has led to criticism of
the statute's civil designation," given that in personam forfeiture
actions are traditionally criminal proceedings due to their penal
nature. " Nonetheless, courts have not rejected the legislature's
civil designation.'" This has allowed prosecutors to bring civil ac-
District Attorney v. McAuliffe, 129 Misc. 2d 416, 418, 493 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1985) (substituted proceeds of money extorted from elderly woman subject
to forfeiture).
Instrumentalities or proceeds from crimes which are not drug offenses can only be for-
feited if there has been a criminal conviction for the underlying offense. N.Y. Civ. PRtAc L.
& R. § 1310(6) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (pre-conviction forfeiture actions pertain only to
specified controlled substance or marihuana offenses).
", See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 669, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 1, 1984),
reprinted in (19841 N.Y. Laws 3627, 3628 (McKinney) (forfeiture law indispensable tool in
battle against drug trafficking); Letter of Assemblyman Miller and Senator Padavan to
Governor (July 12, 1983) (available from New York State Legislative Service and on file at
St. John's law library) (forfeiture law is response to $45 billion per year drug business).
14 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Any action under this
article is in personam and remedial in nature. Id.
I" ld. at § 1310(11) (claiming authority can be district attorney, attorney general, corpo-
ration counsel or county attorney).
" See N.Y. Civ. PAc L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (recovery may be money
judgment). See, e.g., Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211, 220, 500 N.E.2d 850,
854, 508 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156 (1986) (attachment can reach any assets that could be used to
satisfy potential judgment); Kuriansky v. Natural Mold Shoe Corp., 133 Misc. 2d 489, 492,
519 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1986) (attachment of any assets owned
by criminal defendant).
As a result of this in personam nature, it is not even necessary to locate the proceeds of
the crime. See A. GiIEsE, FoRFErruRE HANDBOOK: LITIGATION UNDER CPLR ARTIcL. 13A 33
(New York State District Attorneys' Association 1985). Another advantage for prosecutors
proceeding in personam is the ability to attach property outside the jurisdiction. See Dis-
trict Attorney v. McAuliffe, 129 Misc. 2d 416, 420, 493 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1985) (enjoining sale of property in Pennsylvania). See generally Note,
CPLR 13-A: A District Attorney May Attach the Personal Assets of a Defendant, Prior to Convic-
tion, Without Establishing that the Attached Assets are the Proceeds of a Crime, 61 ST. JoHN's L.
Rav. 203, 205-06 (1986) ($2 million of personal assets attached by district attorney in Court
of Appeals case).
I" Himelein v. Frank, 141 Misc. 2d 416, 419-23, 532 N.Y.S.2d 977, 983 (Sup. Ct. Catta-
raugus County 1988) (constitutional deficiencies in civil designation of Article 13-A), rev'd
on other grounds, 155 App. Div. 2d 964, 547 N.Y.S.2d 775 (4th Dep't 1989). See also 6 J.
ZEr-r, NEw YORK CRMNAL PRAccCE 48a-10 (1988) (type of forfeiture provided for by Arti-
cle 13-A raises serious constitutional questions).
I" See supra note 33 (statutory text of RICO and CCE). See generally Note, Due Process in
Preliminary Proceedings Under RICO and CCE, 83 COLUM. L. Rav. 2068, 2068-69 (1983) (in
personam criminal origins of RICO and CCE).
I54 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). Civil penalty for discharge
Civil Forfeiture
tions even when criminal charges have been dismissed,' 6 without
double jeopardy'56 constraints.5 7
Although there are several variables to consider when proceed-
ing under 13-A,' 8 one thing remains constant: actions must be
grounded upon the commission of a felony.' 5 ' The statute pro-
vides two basic types of forfeiture actions: "post-conviction" for-
feiture actions and "pre-conviction" forfeiture actions. 6 0 Post-
conviction forfeiture actions must be grounded upon a felony con-
viction 61 or criminal activity arising from a common scheme or
of water into navigable waters not deemed criminal after Court asked first, whether Con-
gress indicated a preference for a civil mechanism, and second, whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. Id. See also
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (imposition of double tax for sale of illegal
liquor deemed penalty by Court); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (civil
penalty for tax fraud declared criminal). See generally Note, A Definition of Punishment for
Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Muliple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J. 632,
passim (198 1) (defining punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
'" See Hendley v. Clark, 147 App. Div.2d 347, 349, 543 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (3d Dep't
1989) (dismissal of indictment does not necessarily preclude forfeiture under 13-A). Cf.
Property Clerk of N.Y.C.P.D. v. Hurlston, 104 App. Div.2d 312, 313, 478 N.Y.S.2d 906,
907 (1st Dep't 1984) (dismissal of criminal charges not determinative of issues in city's
forfeiture proceeding).
I" U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be put
twice in jeopardy of life or limb ...." Id. See infra note 154 (discussion of double jeopardy
clause's affect on statutes).
... See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (remedial civil action not pre-
cluded by double jeopardy clause where taxpayer acquitted of criminal charge); United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) (acquittal on criminal
charges does not bar civil forfeiture action). But see Himelein v. Frank, 141 Misc. 2d 416,
422, 532 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1988) (distinguishing 89 Fire-
arms as in rem forfeiture action), rev'd on other grounds, 155 App. Div. 2d 964, 547
N.Y.S.2d 775 (4th Dep't 1989).
1" See infra notes 161, 165, 170 and 171 (post- and pre-conviction actions and criminal
and non-criminal defendants).
'" See N.Y. Crv. PRAc_ L. & R. § 1310(5) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (post-conviction forfei-
ture crime means any felony); id. § 1310(6) (pre-conviction crime means only controlled
substance offense or criminal possession or sale of marihuana in first degree); id. § 1310(4-
b) (specified felony offenses necessary for real property instrumentality crime require fel-
ony conviction).
"' See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (post-conviction and pre-conviction
crimes).
"I' See N.Y. Cxv. PRAC. L. & R. § 131 1(lXa) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See, e.g., Holtzman v.
Samuel, 130 Misc. 2d 976, 979, 495 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985)
(there must be conviction prior to forfeiture for post-conviction crime; property may be
attached under forfeiture statute pending outcome of indictment); District Attorney of
Queens County v. McAuliffe, 129 Misc. 2d 416, 420, 493 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1985) (forfeiture may be granted upon conviction of extortion and grand
larceny); Holtzman v. Bailey, 132 Misc. 2d 25, 26, 503 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1986) (forfeiture of car upon conviction of drunk driving).
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plan of which a conviction is a part.1 " A claiming authority must
establish a post-conviction claim by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."" In contrast, pre-conviction forfeiture actions require
proof of a felony drug offense by clear and convincing evi-
dence.'" Pre-conviction actions are limited to cases where the un-
derlying felony is a drug offense;'" however, they allow prosecu-
tors to go after instrumentalities1'  and proceeds 1 7 of drug
transactions even though no criminal charges are brought.1 "
The statute draws a further distinction between criminal and
non-criminal defendants.'" A criminal defendant is one who the
claiming authority seeks to prove committed the felony and now
has an interest in the property which is subject to forfeiture.17 0 To
prevent the criminal defendant from circumventing the statute by
simply transferring his or her interest to another person, an ac-
tion against a non-criminal defendant may also be brought. 71 Ac-
tions against non-criminal defendants consist of more than prov-
ing that the property is the instrumentality or proceeds of a
crime. 72 The claiming authority must also prove that the non-
criminal defendant knew or should have known of the instrumen-
tality's or proceeds' relationship to the crime or that the defend-
See N.Y. Civ. Pa_ L & R § 1311(lXa) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See, e.g., Vergari v.
Lockhart, 144 Misc. 2d 860, 863, 545 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1989) (forfeiture of drug dealing proceeds after conviction of cocaine possession); Kuriansky
v. Natural Mold Shoe Corp., 133 Misc. 2d 489, 497, 506 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1986) (medical overbillings constituted common scheme or plan), nod-
Ykd on other grounds, 136 Misc. 2d 684, 519 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1987).
U N.Y. Cirv. PRAc L & R. § 131 1(3Xa) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
Id. § 1311(1)(b).
Id. § 1310(6).
i See infra notes 180, 185 and accompanying text (discussion of instrumentalities).
U See infra notes 178, 179, 181-84 and accompanying text (discussion of proceeds and
substituted proceeds).
'" See Kessler, su ra note 146, at 271. The name "pre-conviction" is misleading because
no conviction is actually necessary to bring the action. Id.
I" See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1310(9) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (criminal defendant is
one with criminal liability who has interest in forfeitable property); id. § 1310(10) (non-
criminal defendant is person, other than criminal defendant, who has interest in forfeitable
property); id. § 1311(1) (providing for actions against criminal and non-criminal defend-
ants); id. § 131 1(3)(b) (special provisions for actions against non-criminal defendants).
1,5 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1310(9) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
"' See id. § 1310(10).




ant fraudulently obtained an interest in the property to avoid for-
feiture.1 7 3 Such proof must be established by a preponderance of
the evidence."' By putting the burden on the prosecutor to prove
the knowledge or consent of non-criminal defendants, the New
York statute offers greater protection for innocent owners than
the federal statute, which places all burdens on the owner once
probable cause has been shown. 17  Notably, the personal liability
of non-criminal defendants is limited to the amount of the pro-
ceeds of the drug transaction, 7 unlike criminal defendants who
may be liable for the value of an instrumentality even if that value
greatly exceeds the amount of any proceeds.17 7
A. The Reach of New York's Forfeiture Statute
Prosecutors can reach the proceeds of a crime,17S substituted
proceeds of a crime,'79 or an instrumentality of a crime.1 80 Pro-
ceeds include any appreciation in value" ' and the defendant need
11$ See N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. § 1311(3)(bX2XA), (B) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
114 Id.
s See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text (discussion of probable cause).
" See supra note 146 (recovery against non-criminal defendants limited to proceeds of
crime); Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211, 215-16, 500 N.E.2d 850, 853, 508
N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1986) (personal bank account with value exceeding proceeds of crime
cannot be reached if defendants are non-criminal).
I" See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991). A civil action may be
commenced against a criminal defendant to recover a money judgment equivalent in value
to the property which constitutes an instrumentality of a crime or the real property instru-
mentality of a crime. Id. See, e.g., Dillon v. Morgan Oil Terminals Corp., 138 Misc. 2d 135,
139, 523 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (Nassau County Ct. 1987) (forfeiture of value of instrumental-
ity substantially in excess of proceeds from grand larceny).
"IS See N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (statutory provision for
forfeiture of proceeds). See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 138 Misc. 2d 1015, 1016, 525 N.Y.S.2d
1002, 1003 (Nassau County Ct. 1988) (attachment of proceeds from drug ring); Dillon v.
Schiavo, 114 App. Div. 2d 924, 925, 495 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (2d Dep't 1985) (attachment
of bank account containing proceeds from automobile "chop shop"); Morgenthau v.
Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211, 221, 500 N.E.2d 850, 855, 508 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156 (1986)
(citing government interest in stripping criminals of their ill-gotten gains).
'" See N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & . § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (providing for forfeiture
of substituted proceeds). See also infra note 185 and accompanying text (discussion of sub-
stituted proceeds).
I" See N.Y. Civ. Paxc. L. & R. § 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (providing for forfeiture
of instrumentalities); infta notes 186, 188 and accompanying text (discussion of
instrumentalities).
151 NEw YoRK CIVIL PRAcncx, supra note 146, at 13-A-8. If a bank robber puts his
$10,000 booty in a money market account and earns $1,000 interest, the entire S 11,000 is
forfeitable. See Kessler, Taking the Profit Out of Crime: Asset Forfeiture, 59 N.Y.S.B.J. 48, 50
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not have actually received the benefit of the proceeds.182 Revi-
sions in the statute which became effective November 1, 1990 in-
clude a rebuttable presumption that money found in close proxim-
ity to a requisite quantity of a controlled substance or marihuana
is proceeds of a pre-conviction forfeiture crime. 1 83 Substituted
proceeds are also reachable, lest the defendant avoid forfeiture by
merely converting ill-gotten gains into another form of prop-
erty.'" In addition, when property directly and materially con-
tributes to the commission of a felony, it is also forfeitable as an
insiruI1entLaiiy of thaE crime."'
(July 1987). Appreciation might be interest earned on money or increased value of real
estate. id.
131 See Kuriansky v. Natural Mold Shoe Corp., 133 Misc. 2d 489, 497, 506 N.Y.S.2d
940, 947 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1986). The criminal defendant need not benefit
from crime for the proceeds to be forfeited. Id. Also, when a group of defendants partici-
pate in a crime they are held jointly and severally for the proceeds. Id.
I" See N.Y. Civ. PaRic L. & R. § 131 1(3Xd) & (e) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The requisite
quantity to invoke this presumption is an amount sufficient to constitute a violation of N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 220.18 (criminal possession of controlled substance in second degree) or §
220.21 (criminal possession of controlled substance in first degree). Id. Additionally, this
presumption applies to money found in close proximity to any quantity of controlled sub-
stance or marihuana if possessed in a room other than a public place under circumstances
evincing an intent to distribute the drugs. N.Y. Civ. PAG L. & R. § 131 1(3Xd)(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1991).
134 See NEW YORK CrVIL PRA-rICE, supra note 146, at- 13-A-9. This broadens the scope of
forfeiture by allowing the claiming authority to recover traceable fruits of the underlying
crime. Id. It also prevents defendants from hiding assets by merely selling or transferring
them. Id. See, e.g., District Attorney of Queens County v. McAuliffe, 129 Misc.2d 416, 426,
493 N.Y.S.2d 406, 413 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) (attachment of real property pur-
chased with proceeds from extortion).
I" See N.Y. Cirv. PRArc L. & R. § 1310(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The statute provides:
"'Instrumentality of a crime' means any property, other than real property and any build-
ings, fixtures, appurtenances, and improvements thereon, whose use contributes directly
and materially to the commission of a crime defined in subdivisions five [post-conviction
forfeiture crimes] and six [pre-conviction forfeiture crimes] hereof." Id. See, e.g., Dillon v.
Schiavo, 114 App. Div.2d 924, 925, 495 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (2d Dep't 1985) (attachment of
machines and vehicles used in automobile "chop shop" operation); Dillon v. Morgan Oil
Terminals Corp., 138 Misc. 2d 135, 136, 523 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1987) (attachment of tractor trailer as instrumentality of grand larceny); Holtzman v. Bai-
ley, 132 Misc. 2d 25, 29, 503 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1986) (automobile
subject to forfeiture as instrumentality of drunk driving); Dillon v. Ferrandino, 132 Misc.
2d 334, 335, 503 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (Nassau County Ct. 1986) (corporation subject to
forfeiture as front for illegal drug operation); Holtzman v. Samuel, 130 Misc. 2d 976, 984,
495 N.Y.S.2d 583, 589-90 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985) (attachment of all property at
premises where doctors performed fraudulent abortions).
Vehicles used as instrumentalities in drug offenses are generally proceeded against under
another statute. See N.Y. PuB. HALrH LAW § 3388 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990). This
statute pertains only to vehicles, vessels, or aircrafts used to convey, conceal or transport
controlled substances. Id. See e.g., Chesworth v. Block, 145 App. Div.2d 418, 419, 535
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Real property that contributes directly and materially to the
commission of a "specified felony offense" 1" was recently added
to the list of subject matter forfeitable under the statute. 167 These
offenses include only drug offenses and must be indicative of con-
tinuing use or sales.'" Each of the specified felony offenses re-
quires a conviction, although proof of other transactions may be
required depending on the severity of the crime for which there
was a conviction. 1 " If the defendant can provide evidence that
the conduct underlying the criminal conviction would not alone
N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (2d Dep't 1988) (auto involved in cocaine sale forfeited); Vergari v.
Kraisky, 120 App. Div.2d 739, 740, 502 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789-90 (2d Dep't 1986) (auto for-
feited after defendant convicted of drug sale in car); Jock v. Pikulik, 88 App. Div.2d 1023,
1023, 451 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (3d Dep't 1982) (same). Section 3388 specifically disallows
forfeiture where an owner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the illegal use
was not intended by the owner or took place while in the unlawful possession of another
person. See N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 3388(6) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
I" See N.Y. CiV. PItAc. L. &. R. § 1310(4-b) (McKinney Supp. 1991). There are three types
of specified felony offenses. Subdivision (a) consists of a conviction or guilty plea of crimi-
nal sale or possession of a controlled substance in the first or second degree or conviction
of conspiracy to commit one of those felonies if the object of the conspiracy is located in
the real property which is the subject of the forfeiture action. Id.
Subdivision (b) includes the crimes listed in subdivision (a) in addition to criminal sale of
a controlled substance in the third, fourth or fifth degrees; criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance in the third or fourth degree; and criminal sale of marihuana in the first
degree. Id. However, subdivision (b) applies to engaging in the conduct defined by those stat-
utes on three or more occasions and is conditioned upon at least one conviction or guilty
plea. Id. A group of offenses may not constitute a single offense under N.Y. CaM. Poc.
LAW § 40.10. Id.
A specified felony offense under subdivision (c) consists of a conviction or guilty plea to
criminal sale or possession of a controlled substance in the third or fourth degree or crimi-
nal possession of marihuana in the first degree. Id. If the conviction was for a possession
charge it must be established that there was an intent to sell. Id. In addition, there must be
substantial indicia that the defendant used the real property to engage in a continual,
ongoing course of conduct involving the unlawful "mixing, compounding, manufacturing,
warehousing or packaging" of controlled substances. Id. If the conviction was for criminal
possession of marihuana in the first degree, there must be substantial indicia that the real
property was used as part of an illegal trade or business for gain. Id.
11" See supra note 146 (new version of statute which includes real property instrumental-
ity forfeitures). "'Real property instrumentality of a crime' means an interest in real prop-
erty the use of which contributes directly and materially to the commission of a specified
felony offense." N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & R. § 1310(4-a) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See supra note
186 (discussion on specified felony offense).
Real property was initially excluded from the statute out of fear of overzealous prosecu-
tions, i.e., forfeiture of an apartment building because of a drug transaction in the lobby.
See Kessler, supra note 182, at 50. Originally, real property was forfeitable only if it was
proceeds or substituted proceeds of a crime. Kessler, New York's New Forfeiture Lgisation,
Part I, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1990 at 7, col. 1.
' See supra note 186 (types of offenses).
1W See supra note 186 (when proof of other transactions is required).
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establish the elements of one of the specified felony offenses, the
claiming authority must prove the commission of such an offense
by clear and convincing evidence. 1"0
When proceeding against non-criminal owners of real property
there is an extremely high burden of proof."' 1 This serves as a
protection for innocent owners and tenants.1'" The prosecutor
must prove all of the following by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) commission of a specified felony offense, (2) the defendant
knew the property was used for such an offense, and (3) the de-
fPnd ant Pither lnnwinclv nd ,,ilawfillv henefitted from the con-
duct or voluntarily consented to the use of the property for the
offenses."" As a result, prosecutors will likely limit real property
instrumentality actions to criminal defendants.1 "
B. Article 13-A's Provisional Remedies
Prosecutors may ask the court for provisional remedies to pre-
" See N.Y. Civ. PRAC L. & R. § 131 1(3-a) (McKinney Supp. 1991). If the defendant ad-
duces evidence that the conduct underlying the conviction would not establish the elements
of any of the specified felony offenses, "the burden shall be upon the claiming authority to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conduct underlying the criminal convic-
tion would establish the elements" of the specified felony offense. Id.
:91 See infra note 193 and accompanying text (text of statute).
,2 See Letter from Assemblyman Silver to Governor at I (july 18, 1990) (available from
New York State Legislative Service and on file at St. John's law library). '[Tlhe bill contin-
ues and in some cases extends important safeguards to ensure that the property interests of
innocent persons, be they tenants, owners, or mortgagees, are protected when the govern-
ment seeks forfeiture of property." Id. See also Letter from Attorney General to Governor
at 2 (July 17, 1990) (available from New York State Legislative Service and on file at St.
John's law library). "[C]ertain procedures have been included to protect innocent owners
and tenants . I..." ld
I" See N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. § 131 1(3)(bX5) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (applying to non-
criminal defendants). The new section reads:
If the action relates to a real property instrumentality of a crime, the burden shall be
upon the claiming authority to prove those facts referred to in subdivision four-b of
section thirteen hundred ten of this article by clear and convincing evidence. The
claiming authority shall also prove by a clear and convincing evidence that the non-
criminal defendant knew that such property was or would be used for the commis-
sion of specified felony offenses, and either (A) knowingly and unlawfully benefitted
from such conduct or (B) voluntarily agreed to the use of such property for the
commission of such offenses by consent freely given ....
Id.
I" See Kessler, supra note 187, at 7, col. 1. Given the high evidentiary burden imposed
on prosecutors when proceeding against non-criminal defendants, "it would appear that




vent defendants from disposing of property and assets upon learn-
ing of the action being taken against them.1 " The statute autho-
rizes the remedies of attachment, injunction, temporary
receivership, and notice of pendency.'" These remedies may be
granted when there is a substantial probability that the claiming
authority will prevail and that failure to enter the order may re-
sult in the property being made unavailable for forfeiture. 19 7 The
court must also determine that the need to preserve the availabil-
ity of the property outweighs the hardship imposed on the de-
l" See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1312 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (provisional remedies gen-
erally); Letter from New York State Unified Court System to Counsel of Governor (Oct.
18, 1983) (available from New York State Legislative Service and on file at St. John's law
library). "Provisional remedies are available in both pre- and post-conviction actions to pre-
vent a premature disappearance of the proceeds." Id. See also A. GmnsE, supra note 151, at
68-70. Given the nature of at least a large part of the class of persons against whom forfei-
ture actions are likely to be brought, the utility of the entire statute may be contingent
upon the use of these remedies; without them there may be nothing left to forfeit at the
culmination of the proceeding. Id. See e.g., Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211,
220-24, 500 N.E.2d 850, 857-60, 508 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156-59 (1986) (regarding constitu-
tionality of attachment of assets and preliminary injunction on trust account); Vergari v.
Lockhart, 144 Misc. 2d 860, 871-72, 545 N.Y.S.2d 223, 230 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1989) (attachment of funds after cocaine conviction); People v. Jackson, 138 Misc. 2d 1015,
1017, 525 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (Nassau County Ct. 1988) (attachment of assets pending
conviction on drug charges); Dillon v. Morgan Oil Terminals Corp., 138 Misc. 2d 135,
137, 523 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (Nassau County Ct. 1987) (attachment of tractor trailer instru-
mentality of grand larceny); Dillon v. Ferrandino, 132 Misc. 2d 334, 334-35, 503 N.Y.S.2d
675, 676 (Nassau County Ct. 1986) (preliminary injunction placed on corporate instrumen-
tality of drug operation); District Attorney of Queens County v. McAuliffe, 129 Misc. 2d
416, 420-21, 493 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409-10 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) (preliminary in-
junction preventing disposition of real property which was substituted proceeds of
extortion).
The Court of Appeals has expressly acknowledged the importance of the use of provi-
sional remedies to preserve the status quo while a criminal action is pending. See Morgen-
thau v. Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211, 220, 500 N.E.2d 850, 854, 508 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156
(1986).
[l]t would be illogical for the Legislature to authorize the commencement of a for-
feiture action prior to conviction but not allow provisional remedies to preserve the
status quo during the pendency of the criminal action. A contrary interpretation
would contravene the legislative purpose to 'take the profit out of crime.'
Id.
The provisional remedies of article 13-A were essentially adopted from article 60. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 6001 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (allowing provisional remedies in
civil actions).
" See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1312(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See, e.g., Rosen v.
Braun, 2 App. Div.2d 654, 656, 152 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (4th Dep't 1956) (receivership);
Meissner v. Van Iderstine, 206 Misc. 418, 419, 131 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1952) (notice of pendency).
" See N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. § 1312(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
175
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 6: 143, 1990
fendant.19 If the action pertains to real property, the remedy
must not substantially impair the interest of a person other than
the defendant.'"
The modifications in the statute which took effect November 1,
1990 mitigated the harshness of these provisional remedies. 00 De-
fendants may now move to have a remedy vacated or limited in
order to obtain funds for payment of reasonable living expenses,
preservation of property, or for payment of bona fide attorney's
fees.101 Prior to this amendment, courts upheld provisional attach-
in,-nts ;n the, f !nc A ntc' , oaim f h ein deniedc rh'ic nff
counsel.' 0'
C. Subpoena Duces Tecum Under Article 13-A
The recent changes in 13-A also significantly enhance prosecu-
tors' ability to prevent the disposition of property subject to for-
feiture.20 3 Prosecutors can now apply for a subpoena duces te-
1 See id. § 1312(3)(b). See also infra note 201 (new provision allowing relief in particular
circumstances).
Implicit in this section is a due process requirement that the amount of the proceeds can
be shown with some degree of certainty; however, a clear standard has not emerged. See
Kuriansky v. Natural Mold Shoe Corp., 136 Misc. 2d 684, 686, 519 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1987) (plaintiff may use "statistical sampling" method of proving
damages); Dillon v. Secular, 132 Misc. 2d 279, 280, 503 N.Y.S.2d 939, 939 (Nassau County
Ct. 1986) (determination of amount of proceeds must be based on reasonable inferences
due to nature of illicit drug business); Holtzman v. Samuel, 130 Misc. 2d 976, 986, 495
N.Y.S.2d 583, 591 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985) (amount of proceeds must be established
by "concrete evidence").
im N.Y. Civ. PaAc. L. & R. § 1312(3XC) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See Kessler, supra note
188, at 7, col. 1. The prosecution must show that the remedy sought does not diminish,
impair or terminate the lawful property interest of people other than the defendant. Id. If
the prosecution does not meet this burden the court can dismiss the application for forfei-
ture. Id. If the forfeiture sought is a residential lease or statutory tenancy, the court can
modify or terminate the defendant's interest and continue the lawful interests of others. Id.
*"See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussion of how harshness is
mitigated).
"I N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. § 1312(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The attorney's fees must
relate to the forfeiture action or a related criminal matter. Id.
anSee, e.g., Morgenthan v. Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211, 220 500 N.E.2d 850, 856,
508 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156 (1986) (rejecting right to counsel argument); Vergari v. Lockhart,
144 Misc. 2d 860, 871, 545 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1989) (de-
fendant will suffer no great hardship because of inability to retain counsel of choice); Peo-
ple v. Jackson, 138 Misc. 2d 1015, 1017, 525 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (Nassau County Ct.
1988) (neither United States Constitution nor New York State Constitution establishes con-
stitutional right to particular attorney).
I" See N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & R. § 11 -a (McKinney Supp. 1991); infra notes 205-09 and
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cum'" to locate and determine the nature of potentially
forfeitable property.0 5 To obtain such a subpoena, the claiming
authority must demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that is-
suance of the subpoena would be reasonably likely to lead to in-
formation about the forfeitable property.'" The subpoena duces
tecum can be obtained without notice to the potential defendant
to prevent disposal of the tainted assets once he or she learns of
the inquiry.' If it is sought without notice, the prosecutor must
present a factual basis as to why providing notice might result in
the property being made unavailable for forfeiture.'" This
amendment unties the hands of prosecutors who were previously
unable to conduct discovery at a level commensurate with other
civil litigants.'"
D. Protections for Innocent Owners
Article 13-A uniquely provides a mechanism for courts to dis-
miss a forfeiture action or limit it to the amount of proceeds or
substituted proceeds of the crime when necessary in the "interests
of justice."21 The statute lists several factors which courts may
accompanying text (discussion of how subpoena duces tecum increases prosecutors' power).
9" B.*cx's LAw DicTioNARY 1426 (6th Ed. 1990). A subpoena duces tecum is a court
process compelling production of certain specific documents material and relevant to the
facts at issue in the pending judicial proceeding. Id. See, e.g., People v. Ellman, 137 Misc. 2d
946, 523 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 1987) (motion to compel state and
federal tax returns); People v. Ramirez, 129 Misc. 2d 112, 114, 492 N.Y.S. 2d 906, 908
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1985) (motion to produce all official records regarding defendant's
arrest).
m See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & K § 1311-a 2(bX2) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
- Id.
I See id. at § 131 1-a(5) (prosecutor must state when subpoena is without notice).
Forfeiture actions are aimed at criminals who are "expert and skillful in concealing,
transporting or disposing of potentially forfeitable assets." Kessler, supra note 187, at 7,
col. 3.
1 See N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. L. & K § 1311-a(6) (McKinney Supp. 1991). There are several
other requirements for the claiming authority's affidavit which are basically technical, e.g.,
setting forth identity of claiming authority, stating whether a provision has previously been
sought, and stating factual basis for subpoena and nature of information sought. Id. §
131 1-a(IX2X4). The statute expressly places attorney work product beyond the subpoena's
reach. Id. § 131 1-a(3).
- See Kessler, supra note 187, at 7, col. 3. "The current provisions of Article 13-A
place the claiming authority in the same status as any other civil litigant in civil litigation."
Id.
"I Sn N.Y. Crv. PuR. L & R_ § 1311(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991); Ch. 655, § 6, [1990]
N.Y. Laws 1358, 1360 (McKinney) (adding protections for innocent owners of real prop-
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consider when determining if relief should be granted."" These
include the seriousness and circumstances of the crime relative to
the impact of forfeiture,21' the adverse impact of forfeiture upon
innocent persons," the appropriateness of forfeiture where the
criminal proceedings to which the property is connected result in
an acquittal," or if the action involves forfeiture of an instru-
mentality, whether the value of that instrumentality substantially
exceeds the proceeds of the crime."' If forfeiture of real property
is being sought, the court may appoint an administrator to protect
the interests of tenants or may otherwise modify or dismiss the
action to protect the interests of innocent parties." Although de-
fendants have attempted to invoke the "interests of justice" provi-
sion with mixed results,"17 the legislature has sent a clear signal to
courts to reject the rigidity of forfeiture statutes such as 21 U.S.C.
§ 881.18
erty in real property instrumentality proceedings). See also infra note 217 (examples of
courts considering "interests of justice" dismissal). See generally NEw YoRK CIVi. PRACncE,
supra note 146, at 1 1311.07 ("dismissal in the interest of justice" is unique among forfei-
ture provisions); Kessler, supra note 146, at 280 ("interest of justice" dismissal is ostensibly
unique among forfeiture statutes).
211 See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (discussion of considerations when de-
ciding if "interests of justice" relief is appropriate). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.40(3)
(McKinney 1988) (criminal counterpart of § 1331 dismissal in "interests of justice").
I'l See N.Y. Civ. PiRAc L. & R. § 1311 (4XdXl) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
st, See id. § 1311(4XdX2).
" See id. § 1311(4)(dX3).
't See id. § 1311(4Xd)(4). The statute emphatically does not limit itself to the listed con-
siderations. See id. § 131 1(4)(d). "Among the factors, considerations and circumstances the
court may consider, among others . Id. (emphasis added).
"' See id. 1311(4-aXaXI).
... See Vergari v. Lockhart, 144 Misc. 2d 860, 870, 545 N.Y.S.2d 223, 227 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1989) (failure to provide evidence of defendant's needs and no show-
ing of adverse impact on innocent persons precludes dismissal in "interests of justice");
Dillon v. Morgan Oil Terminals Corp., 138 Misc. 2d 135, 138-39, 523 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722
(Nassau County 1987) ("particularly despicable" crime of defrauding school district not
worthy of "interests of justice" limitation despite disproportionate value of instrumentality
as compared to proceeds); Holtzman v. Bailey, 132 Misc. 2d 25, 26, 503 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1986) (court refused exercise of "interests of justice" power by not
dismissing forfeiture sought for car driven by defendant while under influence of alcohol).
1s See A GnRESE, supra note 151, at 60 ("interests of justice" provision answers concern
about potential abuse of broad civil forfeiture mechanism); Letter from Attorney General
to Governor (July 12, 1984) (available from New York State Legislative Service and on file




Both the federal and the New York civil forfeiture statutes seek
to deprive criminals of their ill-gotten gains, without subjecting
innocent owners of property to the harsh effects of forfeiture.
The difficulties involved in finding a consistent approach to the
innocent owner defenses of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) can be resolved by
reading the statute disjunctively, by adopting an objective stan-
dard of actual knowledge, and by adopting a willful standard of
consent. Although some courts have chosen to incorporate Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. into their interpretations of the
statute, by doing so they have effectively overshadowed the lan-
guage of the statute. Courts should refrain from applying the Su-
preme Court's pre-amendment language and allow the statutory
innocent owner provisions to serve their purpose, which is to pro-
tect innocent owners while enforcing federal drug policy.
Congress would do well to consider the way New York has tried
to prevent the inadvertent forfeiture of innocent owners' prop-
erty. The statute expressly allows courts to consider dismissal of
the forfeiture when it would be in the "interests of justice." Per-
haps more importantly, the prosecutor has the burden of proving
the owner's culpable behavior when proceeding against non-crimi-
nal defendants. In addition, forfeiture of real property, a particu-
larly harsh sanction, must be the result of drug sales or the com-
mission of continuing offenses. As a result, fewer innocent owners
would have their property taken in the interests of fighting the
war on drugs.
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